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Which firms find it optimal to integrate their input suppliers into the firm bound-
aries of control (vertical integration)? Which firms choose to expand their sourcing
activities across the national border (offshoring)? This letter provides novel evi-
dence on these questions based on a Spanish firm-level data set. We find that firms
selecting into strategies of vertical integration and of offshoring tend to have been
more productive ex ante than firms choosing not to do so. This finding is in line
with the recent heterogeneous-firm literature on input sourcing under incomplete
contracts.
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1 Introduction
The sourcing of inputs is of key importance for a firm’s success. Firms face a two-
dimensional choice problem: they decide about the location of sourcing (foreign vs.
domestic) as well as the ownership structure of sourcing (vertical integration vs. out-
sourcing). Which firms select which sourcing strategy has been the subject of intensive
research, but remains an open question. This letter aims to provide novel empirical
evidence on this interesting question by exploring the relationship between pre-existing
productivity differentials across manufacturing firms in Spain and subsequent choice (or
selection) of different sourcing strategies.
Identification of productivity-based firm selection is important, because it points to
aggregate productivity effects. Changes in the costs of operating a strategy of vertical
integration or of outsourcing, domestically or abroad, have the potential to change the
aggregate productivity of an industry, by analogy to the selection effects of trade and
foreign direct investment discussed in Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004).
We use data from the Spanish “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” (ESEE)
from 2006-2011 to investigate how firms’ selection of sourcing strategies in year t is
related to their productivity in years prior to t. Overall, we find evidence that firms that
select strategies of vertical integration and of offshoring ex post tend to have been more
productive ex ante. We call this an “ex ante sourcing premium” of vertical integration
and offshoring, respectively. It points to causation running from productivity to sourcing
modes, as required for the above mentioned aggregate productivity effects.
This finding is in line with the recent literature on global sourcing by heterogeneous
firms. This literature studies the boundaries of the firm—a classical question in economics
dating back to Coase (1937)—against the backdrop of a global economy that allows for
firms to move the source of their inputs abroad; see Helpman (2006) and Antràs (2013)
for surveys. In an application of the property-rights theory of the firm (Grossman &
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990), Antràs & Helpman (2004) introduce a monopolistic
competition model in which vertical integration and offshoring can be advantageous in
terms of variable production costs, but disadvantageous in terms of fixed costs. Hence
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there is a trade-off, and the optimal sourcing strategy depends on the firm’s productivity.
Existing empirical literature focuses on the contemporaneous relationship between
a firm’s productivity and its sourcing behaviour, and it has produced mixed evidence.
Defever & Toubal (2012) find that French firms relying on an outsourced (rather than an
integrated) foreign supplier tend to be more productive. Corcos et al. (2013) document
the opposite pattern in an extended sample of the same French data source. Federico
(2010, 2012) provides evidence that firms choosing strategies of vertical integration and
of offshoring tend to be more productive than firms that source their inputs domestically
and from independent suppliers. Tomiura (2007) and Kohler & Smolka (2011, 2012) find
similar patterns in Japanese data and ESEE data, respectively. A common feature of
these studies is that time-series information is not available or, where available, has not
been exploited to address firm selection. Hence causality remains an open issue. Fariñas
et al. (2010) and Wagner (2011) find evidence for productivity-based firm selection into
offshoring. However, they do not study (or condition on) the ownership structure of
sourcing due to lack of data. We contribute to the literature by addressing firm selection
in both dimensions of sourcing, location and ownership structure, and by exploiting panel
data towards estimating the corresponding “ex ante sourcing premia”.
2 Data and identification
ESEE is a longitudinal dataset of Spanish manufacturing firms with 10 or more employees.
There are at least three advantages of using ESEE data for this work. The first is that
it is based on a truly representative sample. The initial selection of firms in 1990 was
carried out through a two-way sampling scheme, distinguishing between large firms (more
than 200 employees; exhaustive sampling) and small firms (10-200 employees; stratified,
proportional, and systematic sampling with a random seed). Subsequent sampling was
carried out in a way that preserves representativeness of the sample with respect to the
Spanish manufacturing sector with 10 or more employees.1
1More information on ESEE data and its sampling properties are available at
http://www.fundacionsepi.es/esee/en/epresentacion.asp (accessed on 25/10/2013).
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The second advantage of this data set is the level of detail. The ESEE survey collects
data on a large set of firm characteristics, including firms’ main activities, their account-
ing statements, as well as information on their customers and suppliers. Importantly,
information on output and the use of labor as well as capital allow for firms’ productivity
levels to be estimated using standard estimation routines. Of special importance for the
present purpose, the survey obtains answers to the following questions:
• Of the total amount of purchases of goods and services that you incorporate (trans-
form) in the production process, indicate − according to the type of supplier − the
percentage that these represent in the total amount of purchases of your firm in
[year].
(a) Spanish suppliers that belong to your group of companies or that participate in
your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no] / [if yes, then percentage rate]
(b) Other suppliers located in Spain. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
• For the year [year], indicate whether you imported goods and services that you
incorporate (transform) in the production process, and the percentage that theses
imports − according to the type of supplier − represent in the total value of your
imports. [yes/no]
(a) From suppliers that belong to your group of companies and/or from foreign
firms that participate in your firm’s joint capital. [yes/no]/[if yes, then per-
centage rate]
(b) From other foreign firms. [yes/no]/[if yes, then percentage rate]
We are thus able to identify foreign integration (FI), foreign outsourcing (FO), domestic
integration (DI) and domestic outsourcing (DO) as distinct sourcing strategies. In 2011,
5.0% of small firms and 34.1% of large firms have relied on FI. The corresponding
numbers are 40.2% and 70.1% for FO, 10.9% and 33.6% for DI, and 93.6% and 93.5% for
DO. Thus, the sourcing strategies are not mutually exclusive, but appear complementary
to one another (Kohler & Smolka, 2011).
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The third advantage of our data is given by its panel structure and time horizon.
Firms rarely change their sourcing from one year to another. This means that a relatively
long time horizon is essential in order to have sufficient variation in the data that can be
exploited for identification purposes. ESEE data on both dimensions of sourcing (location
and ownership structure) has been collected for six consecutive years from 2006 to 2011.
The average number of sourcing strategies used in 2006 was 1.37 for small firms and 2.11
for large firms. In 2011, the same numbers were 1.50 and 2.31, respectively. This trend
towards a stronger fragmentation of the production process was largely driven by firms
adding either FI or FO to their existing sourcing portfolios, which indicates growing
importance of offshoring.
We use regression analysis in order to compare the ex ante productivity across firms
that select the same sourcing strategy in year t− 1 (the pre-selection period), but select
different sourcing strategies in year t (the selection period). Key to our approach are
suitable sample restrictions imposed to identify productivity-based firm selection into
both vertical integration (conditional on the location of sourcing) and foreign sourcing
(conditional on the ownership structure of sourcing). Figure 1 illustrates the identification
of firm selection into vertical integration, conditional on the firm sourcing abroad: we first
restrict the sample to firms that select FO, DI, and DO at both t−1 and t, and to firms
that do not select FI at t − x, with x = 1, . . . , t − 1. This sample restriction leaves us
with a sufficient number of firms that differ in their FI status (the strategy of interest) in
the selection period, but that behave identical otherwise, both in the pre-selection period
as well as in the selection period.2 We then estimate the pre-selection productivity
differences (in both levels and first differences) between firms choosing to select FI in
the selection period and firms choosing not to change their sourcing strategy, controlling
for a host of other firm characteristics. We do so in a linear regression framework where
selection into FI is captured through a (0, 1) indicator variable (the selection variable).3
2We include firms that—in addition to sourcing abroad—choose to source domestically as well, since
we would otherwise be left with an almost empty set of firms.
3Notice that for a given firm the selection variable can be equal to zero in one period and equal to
one in another (subsequent) period. In principle, the model could therefore be identified even in case we
observed just a single firm through time.
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We apply the Olley & Pakes (1996) estimation algorithm, henceforth called OPA, in
order to estimate total factor productivity (TFP) as a firm-specific, time-variant vari-
able. The OPA avoids estimation biases due to endogenous selection into markets and
simultaneous choice of input factors. We feed the OPA with ESEE data from 2000-2011,
using annual information on each firm’s real output, real investment, real capital stock,
real purchases, labor employment, and exit decisions. Real output is the total production
value plus other operating income (income from rent and leasing, industrial property,
commissions, and certain services), expressed in terms of prices of the year 2000. We
deflate production values and other types of operating revenue by using firm-level ESEE
data on goods price variations along with an industry-level price index from the Span-
ish Instituto Nacional de Estad́ıstica (INE) for years with missing data. This avoids
estimation biases due to firm-specific mark-up pricing, firm-specific demand shocks, or
firm-specific market access (Klette & Griliches, 1996; De Loecker, 2007). Real investment
is the total investment value in real estate, construction, and equipment, deflated with an
industry-level INE price index. The real capital stock is the reported value of real estate,
construction, and equipment, deflated with an industry-level INE price index. We use
a firm-level price index along with industry-level INE data to compute real purchases,
defined as the total expenditure on intermediate inputs and external services. Labor em-
ployment is measured by effectively worked hours. Exit decisions of firms documented in
ESEE data allows us to distinguish firms shutting down production from firms staying
in the market, but exiting the sample.
3 Results
Table 1 reports the main results from the analysis of firm selection into vertical integra-
tion. There is strong evidence that the more productive firms self-select into strategies
of vertical integration, whether in the foreign or in the domestic economy. We obtain an
estimated coefficient of the selection variable which is above 0.2 and significantly different
from zero, when estimating TFP differences in levels and not including any firm-level con-
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trols. If we control for a firm’s age, skill intensity, capital intensity, technological effort,
export status, and foreign ownership, the estimated coefficient of the selection variable
is slightly below 0.2, but with a strictly positive lower confidence limit. This means that
in the pre-selection period the firms self-selecting into vertical integration are on average
somewhat less than twenty percent more productive than their competitors in the same
industry with otherwise identical characteristics. These are quite strong and interesting
results, also because the two samples employed in Table 1 are entirely disjunct. There is,
however, no evidence that pre-selection TFP growth is larger for firms selecting vertical
integration—the estimated coefficient of the respective selection variable has a negative
sign throughout and is not significantly different from zero. This is in line with existing
theory, where sourcing is driven by productivity levels, not productivity growth.
Table 2 looks at firm selection into foreign sourcing. While there is again little ev-
idence for differences in TFP growth in the pre-selection period, we find clear evidence
for differences in TFP levels prior to selecting into strategies of foreign sourcing. The es-
timated coefficient of the corresponding selection variable is between +0.074 and +0.139
when we condition on firms relying exclusively on an outsourced production structure,
and between +0.219 and +0.279 when we condition on firms operating an integrated
production structure.4 With a single exception, the estimated coefficients are statisti-
cally significant at least at the 5% level. These results strongly suggest that the more
productive firms self-select into strategies of foreign sourcing, whether they operate an
integrated or an outsourced production structure.
4 Conclusions
We present novel evidence on sourcing behavior, based on direct observation of firms’ self-
selection. Using panel data information on Spanish firms, we find that among the firms
that abstain from vertical integration to start with, it will be the more productive ones
that subsequently self-select into strategies of vertical integration (at home or abroad).
4In this latter case, we include firms that—in addition to domestic integration—rely on domestic
outsourcing as well, in order to have a sufficiently large number of firms in the sample. The two samples
employed in Table 2 are nevertheless entirely disjunct.
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The same pattern is found for self-selection of firms into foreign sourcing (integrated or
outsourced).
Two comments on these findings are in order. First, our results only hold on average
across industries. Hence, it is possible that in some industries it is the less productive
firms (rather than the highly productive ones) that select into vertical integration. This
could explain the seemingly contradictory results found in Defever & Toubal (2012) and
Corcos et al. (2013). Second, and relatedly, while the productivity-based firm selection
evidenced by our data supports a central tenet of the recent heterogeneous-firm literature
on global sourcing, it should not be interpreted as lending support to any specific model
of sourcing. To see whether the selection patterns found in this paper are in line with the
predictions of a certain theoretical model of sourcing, we need an empirical strategy that
goes beyond establishing the mere presence and direction of self-selection. In particular,
we must establish a connection between the detailed pattern of self-selection and certain
industry- and firm-specific variables that theoretical models propose, over and above a




Figure 1: Identification of productivity-based firm selection into vertical integration (con-
ditional on foreign sourcing)
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Table 1: Productivity-based firm selection into vertical integration
Selection variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
FI status at t (left panel) OR 0.216** 0.182** -0.023 -0.031 0.242** 0.169* -0.043 -0.047
DI status at t (right panel) (0.101) (0.092) (0.025) (0.030) (0.097) (0.093) (0.041) (0.041)
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 379 359 379 359 3,359 3,331 3,351 3,323
% of switching firms >5% >5% >5% >5% >1% >1% >1% >1%
R-squared 0.532 0.649 0.429 0.468 0.047 0.124 0.059 0.061
reign
at t-x: FO status= ; with x= ,…,t- at t-x: FI status= ; with x= ,…,t-
The table reports estimated coefficients of the selection variable for vertical integration, as explained in Section 2. The left panel (offshore production) looks at vertical
integration conditional on the firm sourcing abroad; the right panel (domestic production) looks at vertical integration conditional on the firm sourcing domestically only.
The variables FI status , FO status , DI status, and DO status are dummy variables for the respective sourcing strategies. Industry-year constants are always included. Firm-
level controls are a firm's age, skill intensity (graduate workers over total workers, in logs), capital intensity (capital assets over average number of workers, in logs),
technological effort (R&D costs plus technology imports over total sales, in logs), export status, and an ordered variable for the ratio of foreign capital in the firm's joint
capital (zero;one:0-25;two:25-50;three:>50). Robust standards errors (clustered by firm) are given in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively.
at t-1 and t: FO status=1 & DI status=1 & DO status=1 at t-1 and t: FI status=0 & FO status=0 & DO status=1
TFP level TFP growth TFP level TFP growth
Offshore production Domestic production
Sample restrictions: Sample restrictions:
at t-x: FI status= , with x= ,…,t- at t-x: DI status= , with x= ,…,t-
Table 2: Productivity-based firm selection into foreign sourcing
Selection variable (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII)
FO status at t (left panel) OR 0.139*** 0.074*** 0.003 0.001 0.279** 0.219 0.112 0.112
FI status at t (right panel) (0.026) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.137) (0.142) (0.157) (0.151)
Firm-level controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of observations 3,287 3,260 3,281 3,254 289 280 286 277
% of switching firms >8% >8% >8% >8% >1% >1% >1% >1%
R-squared 0.054 0.129 0.058 0.060 0.437 0.507 0.555 0.573
The table reports estimated coefficients of the selection variable for foreign sourcing, as explained in Section 2. The left panel (outsourced production) looks at foreign
sourcing conditional on the firm operating an outsourced production structure only; the right panel (integrated production) looks at foreign sourcing conditional on the firm
operating an integrated production structure. The variables FI status , FO status , DI status, and DO status are dummy variables for the respective sourcing strategies.
Industry-year constants are always included. Firm-level controls are a firm's age, skill intensity (graduate workers over total workers, in logs), capital intensity (capital assets
over average number of workers, in logs), technological effort (R&D costs plus technology imports over total sales, in logs), export status, and an ordered variable for the
ratio of foreign capital in the firm's joint capital (zero;one:0-25;two:25-50;three:>50). Robust standards errors (clustered by firm) are given in parenthesis. *,**,*** indicate
statistical signficance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
at t-x: FO status= ; with x= ,…,t- at t-x: FI status= ; with x= ,…,t-
at t-1 and t: DI status=0 & FI status=0 & DO status=1 at t-1 and t: FO status=0 & DI status=1 & DO status=1
TFP level TFP growth TFP level TFP growth
Outsourced production Integrated production
Sample re rictions: Sample restrictions:
 -x: FI status= , with x= ,…,t-  -x: DI status= , with x= ,…, -
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